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AN “APP” FOR THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARIES
David G. Epstein *, Alexandra W. Cook **, J. Kyle Lowder ***,
& Michelle Sonntag****
Abstract: Every year, more than 100 reported court opinions consider the question of
whether an outsider can sue for damages under a contract made by others—in part because
the law is so ambiguous. While contract enforcement by a third party is controlled largely by
the facts of the particular case, it also materially depends upon the relevant legal standards.
At present, not just the standards, but also the reasons for these standards, are unclear.
1

Eighty years ago, Lon Fuller, a professor teaching contracts at a then-Southern law
2
school, and William Perdue, a student at that school, significantly clarified and improved
decision-making on damages issues in contract law by proposing a new vocabulary and
3
analytical model. The senior author of this Article is a professor at a Southern law school,
4
but he does not need an academic Lloyd Bentsen to tell him that he is “no Lon Fuller,” and

* George E. Allen Chair, University of Richmond Law School. We are grateful to the law firm of
Allen, Allen, Allen and Allen for its generous support of the University of Richmond Law School.
This article benefitted from faculty workshops at the University of Richmond Law School, the
University of Arkansas Law School, St. Mary’s Law School, the Texas A&M Law School, and the
Texas Tech Law School. Thanks also to Alexis Fetzer of the University of Richmond Law Library
for her efforts and expertise in finding sources and Corinna Lain, the University of Richmond’s
uncommonly helpful red-haired Associate Dean for Academic Development, for suggesting the
“red-headed stepchild” reference and so much more.
** University of Richmond Law School, Class of 2017.
*** University of Richmond Law School, Class of 2017.
**** University of Richmond Law School, Class of 2017.
1. See generally Albert M. Sachs, Lon Luvois Fuller, 92 HARV. L. REV. 349 (1978) (describing
the legacy of Lon Fuller).
2. Professor Fuller was a professor at Duke Law School in Durham, North Carolina—a Southern
town if ever there was one. (Remember the movie Bull Durham?) While Duke Law School is still
located in the Southern town of Durham, its website shows that only 19% of its students are from
the South. Class of 2019 Profile, DUKE LAW, https://law.duke.edu/admis/classprofile/
[https://perma.cc/L4MT-7YDG]. The website provides no information about how many of that 19%
went to Eastern prep schools and Ivy colleges or how many of the faculty come from the South.
Duke is, of course, a fine law school. Duke is no longer a Southern law school.
3. See L.L. Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE
L.J. 52, 53–54 (1936).
4. See Educational Video Group, Excerpt from Vice Presidential Debate in 1988 Between Lloyd
Bentsen and Dan Quayle, YOUTUBE (Oct. 1, 2012), https://www.youtube.com/watch?
v=9PCsXqbSZxc (last visited Nov. 4, 2016). The late Professor Robert Summers would have
happily played the role of Senator Bentsen. In Professor Summers’ biography of Lon Fuller,
Professor Summer referred to Professor Fuller as “one of the four most important American legal
theorists of the 20th century.” See ROBERT S. SUMMERS, L. LON FULLER 1 (1984). The senior author
of this article was not one of the other three.
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the younger co-authors hold no “William Perdue illusion,” given that Mr. Perdue was the
father-in-law of their law school dean. Nonetheless, we believe that the new vocabulary and
analytical model we are proposing would clarify and improve decision-making on third party
contract rights.

INTRODUCTION .............................................................................. 1664
I.
AN EXPLANATION OF THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY
LAW: HOW WE GOT TO WHERE WE ARE ...................... 1668
A. Privity ............................................................................... 1668
B. Lawrence v. Fox ............................................................... 1670
C. Seaver v. Ransom ............................................................. 1672
D. Williston and Corbin ........................................................ 1673
E. First Restatement .............................................................. 1675
F. Second Restatement ......................................................... 1678
II.
REVIEW OF CURRENT CASES: CONFUSION AS TO
WHERE WE ARE ................................................................... 1682
A. Whose Intent Is Relevant? ................................................ 1683
1. Promisee’s Intent ........................................................ 1683
2. Promisor’s Intent ........................................................ 1685
3. Both Parties’ Intent ..................................................... 1687
B. What Intent Is Relevant? .................................................. 1687
1. Intent to Benefit the Third Party ................................. 1688
2. Intent to Assume a Direct Obligation ......................... 1689
3. Intent to Grant the Third Party Legal Rights in the
Contract ...................................................................... 1690
C. Summary of Cases ............................................................ 1691
III. WHERE WE SHOULD BE..................................................... 1692
A. Consequences of Third Party Contract Rights on the
Promisee ........................................................................... 1692
B. Consequences of Third Party Contract Rights on the
Promisor ........................................................................... 1694
1. No Double Recovery .................................................. 1694
2. More Damages ............................................................ 1694
3. More Litigation ........................................................... 1698
C. An Analytical Approach that Reflects Practical
Consequences ................................................................... 1699
CONCLUSION .................................................................................. 1702

INTRODUCTION
The third party beneficiary doctrine is the red-headed stepchild of
contract law as contract law is “practiced” in law schools. In the
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standard contracts casebook, two or three third party beneficiary cases
are inserted at the back of the book. 5 Most contracts professors do not
even cover the third party beneficiary cases.6
Moreover, there has been comparatively little attention to third party
beneficiary concepts in American law reviews. The two most cited third
party beneficiary articles were published in 1985 7 and 1992. 8 The last
lead article devoted to the general topic of third party beneficiary law
was published in 1993. 9
Third party beneficiary law gets far more attention from those who
practice contract law in law offices and courtrooms. 10 Practitioner texts
regularly address third party beneficiary possibilities, recommending
that commercial contracts include provisions excluding third party
beneficiaries. 11 Such provisions are often enforced. 12
However, these recommendations that commercial contracts include
provisions excluding third party beneficiaries are not universally
followed, or when followed, the provisions are ignored by plaintiffs’
attorneys anyway. 13 We have found more than 500 judicial opinions
5. E.g., IAN AYRES & RICHARD E. SPIEDEL, STUDIES IN CONTRACT LAW 1168–91 (7th ed. 2008)
(chapter 9 of 9); JACK GRAVES, LEARNING CONTRACTS 694–707 (2014) (chapter 10 of 10).
6. Cf. MARK P. GERGEN, TEACHER’S MANUAL TO BASIC CONTRACT LAW NINTH EDITION 149
(2013) (“Chapter 19. Third-Party Beneficiaries (pp.941–987) I do not cover these materials.”).
7. Anthony Jon Waters, The Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary
Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109 (1985).
8. Melvin Aron Eisenberg, Third Party Beneficiaries, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 1358 (1992).
9. Jean Fleming Powers, Expanded Liability and the Intent Requirement in Third Party
Beneficiary Contracts, 1993 UTAH L. REV. 67. There have been subsequent law review articles that
discuss third party concepts as a part of some other, more specific topic. See, e.g., George S. Geis,
Broadcast Contracting, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1153 (2012); Nicolas Cornell, The Puzzle of the
Beneficiary’s Bargain, 90 TUL. L. REV. 75 (2015); Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Third Party
Beneficiaries and Contractual Networks, 7 J. OF LEGAL ANALYSIS 325 (2015).
10. Cf. Harry G. Prince, Perfecting the Third Party Standing Rule Under Section 302 of the
Restatement (Second) of Contracts, 25 B.C. L. REV. 919, 920 (1984) (“A subject that should be of
measureable concern to every practicing lawyer whose clients have even a minimal involvement in
the American socio-economic environment.”).
11. See, e.g., SCOTT T. WITTAKER, ET AL., ABA SECTION OF BUS. LAW, WHO INVITED YOU?
THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY ISSUES IN M&A TRANSACTIONS 4–134 (2005), http://apps.
americanbar.org/buslaw/newsletter/0038/materials/pp7.pdf [https://perma.cc/S7ZQ-K3TU].
12. See, e.g., Fornazor Int’l, Inc. v. Huntsman, No. 2:14-CV-291 TS, 2015 WL 6142962, at *8
(D. Utah Oct. 19, 2015) (“Utah courts have dismissed a third party beneficiary claim pursuant to a
Rule 12(b)(6) motion where the contract contained a clause declaring that there was no intended
third-party beneficiary.”).
13. Id. (“Fornazor argues that [the] ‘no third party beneficiary’ disclaimer does not preclude a
factual finding of the third party beneficiary status in the face of conflicting evidence. However, that
is not the law in Utah.”); see also Wolf v. Celebrity Cruises, Inc., 101 F. Supp. 3d 1298 (S.D. Fla.
2015) (“The Tour Operator Agreement at issue here contains the following language with respect to
third party beneficiaries: ‘Other than as expressly set forth herein, this Agreement shall not be
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issued in the last five years that have considered the question of when a
person, who is not a party to a contract, is able to enforce that contract
because the individual is an “intended third party beneficiary.” 14
Most of the cases use not only the term “intended third party
beneficiary,” but also the terms “promisor” and “promisee.” These
familiar terms can be confusing because in most contracts each party is
making a promise to the other. In third party beneficiary terminology,
the person whose promise the third party is seeking to enforce is the
promisor and the other contracting party is the promisee. 15
Consider this hypothetical: 16 Ed Blomquist contracts with Bud
Jorgenlen to buy Bud’s Butcher Shop in Luverne, Minnesota. Ed
breaches the contract. Bud’s Butcher Shop closes. Noreen Vanderslice,
who worked at the butcher shop, sues Ed for breach of contract. Even
though promisor Ed made his promise to promisee Bud, courts in
Minnesota and elsewhere will, today, hold that third party Noreen can
recover from promisor Ed for breach of contract if Noreen is an
“intended third party beneficiary.” 17

deemed to provide third persons with any remedy, claim, right, or action or other right.’ Through its
express terms, no reading of that language would allow for a finding of either an express or implied
intent by the parties to primarily or directly benefit Mr. Wolf. Not only does the contract expressly
disclaim any intent to provide third parties with any rights, but there are no other provisions in the
contract from which to infer any intent to directly benefit passengers like Mr. Wolf. Mr. Wolf
argues that the requisite intent should be gleaned from contract provisions requiring OCT to acquire
insurance before operating, but I disagree.” (internal citations omitted)).
14. Our use of the term “intended third party beneficiary” to describe a third party who can
enforce a contract is consistent with the usage of most courts and the Restatement. See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (AM. LAW INST. 1979). There are some courts that
use the term “third party beneficiary” to mean a third party who can enforce a contract. See, e.g., In
re Lehman Brothers Holding, Inc., No. 08-13555, 2014 WL 2766164 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 18,
2014) (“Under New York law, a party claiming to be a third-party beneficiary of a contract bears
the burden of demonstrating that the parties to the contract intended to confer a benefit on the third
party.” (emphasis added)).
15. SUZANNE DARROW-KLEINHAUS, ACING CONTRACTS 335–36 (2010) (“[T]he ‘promisor’ is the
contracting party who is to render the performance to the beneficiary and the ‘promisee’ is the
contracting party whose right to performance has been conferred on the beneficiary.”).
16. But cf. Fargo (TV Series), WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fargo [https://perma.cc/
7WXH-6LRT] (noting each episode of the TV series Fargo begins with the superimposed text,
“This is a true story.”).
17. See Caldas v. Affordable Granite & Stone, Inc., 820 N.W.2d 826, 832 (Minn. 2012) (defining
intended third party beneficiary as “intended beneficiary with legal rights under a contract,” relying
on the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (AM. LAW INST. 1979)). The result would be
the same if the subject matter of the contract were the sale of a butcher shop in England such as
Flackies of Luttenworth, Leicestershire. See FLACKIES OF LUTTENWORTH, http://flackies.net/
[https://perma.cc/KTS6-TBDX ]. In November of 1999, the Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act
1999 came into effect in England, allowing a third party to enforce a contract term if “the term
purports to confer a benefit on him.” See Contracts (Rights of Third Parties) Act 1999 c. 31, § 1(1)
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At present, Noreen’s contract law rights turn on intent. Any doctrine
based on intent is inherently ambiguous from the start. In third party
beneficiary cases, ambiguity is especially problematic because of
unanswered questions about: (1) whose intent is relevant; and (2) what
the relevant intent is.
Hence the cases are widely divided as to outcome. 18 And,
collectively, these cases present an analytic mess in dire need of a
cleanup. This paper undertakes that project. It is an attempt to clean up
the doctrine as well as to answer its basic questions. That project, we
contend, requires a different vocabulary and, more importantly, a
different analytical approach—an approach that focuses on practical
consequences.
The primary practical consequence of determining that Noreen is an
“intended third party beneficiary” is that Noreen becomes an additional
possible plaintiff on the contract entered into by Ed and Bud. And
determining that Noreen is an additional possible plaintiff can have
possible practical consequences to the person she sues for breach of
contract. Accordingly, the operative question should be whether Ed and
Bud had reason to know at the time of their contract that Noreen could
be an additional possible plaintiff (“APP”). Our approach substitutes an
“APP” for third party beneficiary.
To be clear, we do not contend that our approach will eliminate
litigation over whether a person who was not a party to a contract can
nonetheless sue for breach of that contract. Nor do we contend that it
will necessarily effect significant changes in the results of such
litigation. Rather, our claim is that our approach should simplify the
litigation process and should produce litigation results more consistent
with generally accepted contract concepts.
This Article proceeds in three parts. Part I explains the development
of third party beneficiary law. Part II looks to recent cases to illustrate
problems with the present third party beneficiary law. Part III explains
our proposed analytical framework.

(Eng.), http://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1999/31/pdfs/ukpga_19990031_en.pdf [https://perma.
cc/4QGE-CN9B]; see generally ROBERT MERKIN, PRIVITY OF CONTRACT: THE IMPACT OF THE
CONTRACTS (RIGHTS OF THIRD PARTIES) ACT 1999 (2000).
18. The cases are even divided as to whether the term is “third party beneficiary” or “third-party
beneficiary.” Indeed, sometimes the same judge seems to be “divided,” using both terms in the same
opinion. See, e.g., J.C. Penney Properties, Inc. v. Hiram LL, LLC, No. 1:13-CV-02984-CC, 2016
WL 302095 (N.D. Ga. Jan. 25, 2016). Most cases and commentaries use the term “third party
beneficiary” and so does this article.
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AN EXPLANATION OF THIRD PARTY BENEFICIARY LAW:
HOW WE GOT TO WHERE WE ARE

Generally, a person has no legal right to enforce a contract they 19 did
not make. Courts and commentators invoke the contract concept of
privity to explain this general rule.
A.

Privity

An article by Jesse W. Lilienthal, 20 in the first issue of the Harvard
Law Review, provides a short and easy-to-understand 21 working
explanation of privity:
PERHAPS the tradition in the elementary law of contracts most
thoroughly grounded in the minds of law students is the general
proposition that an agreement between A and B cannot be sued
upon by C, even though C would be benefited by its
performance. It always was, with Harvard law students at all
events, an article of faith that rights founded on contract belong
to the person who has stipulated for them; and that even the
most express agreement of contracting parties would not confer
any right of action on the contract upon one not a party thereto. 22
Lilienthal’s statement is followed by three items: (1) a footnote from
the law review editors explaining that “[t]his doctrine [privity] is not
taught in the School at the present day”; 23 (2) an attempt at explaining
the case that “exploded” 24 the privity rule, Lawrence v. Fox; 25 and (3)
repeated efforts to explain later courts’ application of Lawrence v. Fox. 26
19. Jeff Guo, Sorry, Grammar Nerds. The Singular ‘They” Has Been Declared Word of the Year,
WASH. POST (Jan. 8, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2016/01/08/donaldtrump-may-win-this-years-word-of-the-year/ [https://perma.cc/B2Y8-7P77].
20. Despite contributing only one article to third party beneficiary law, Jesse Lilienthal was an
uncommonly accomplished and interesting person. See LILLIE BERNHEIMER LILIENTHAL, IN
MEMORIAM: JESSE WARREN LILIENTHAL (1921), https://archive.org/details/inmemoriamjessew
00liliiala [https://perma.cc/CEZ7-WLAA].
21. For a more complete (and complex) explanation of privity, see generally MICHAEL
FURMSTON & GREGORY TOLHURST, PRIVITY OF CONTRACTS (2015); VERNON VALENTINE
PALMER, THE PATHS TO PRIVITY (1992).
22. Jesse W. Lilienthal, Privity of Contracts, 1 HARV. L. REV. 226, 226 (1887).
23. Id. at 226 n.1. This footnote inserted by the student editors is consistent with the surprisingly
conversational tone of the article—very different from the tone of the articles in volume 129.
24. Id. at 226. But cf. ARTHUR CORBIN, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 778 (1951) [hereinafter
CORBIN] (“It is sometimes believed that all that is necessary to bring the third party into ‘privity’
with the promisor is that the contract shall be expressly made for his benefit.”).
25. 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
26. Lilienthal, supra note 22, at 226.
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“At present day,” privity is no longer taught at most law schools—not
just “the School” 27—except in answering the question of when third
parties can enforce warranties of quality in sale of goods contracts made
by others. Section 2-318 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC)
answers this question. 28
Our paper does not deal with section 2-318 of the UCC. Section 2318 has been fully explored and explained by other articles. 29 Courts
have comparatively few problems applying section 2-318 to determine
whether a person who was not a party to a sale of goods contract can still
recover for breach of a UCC warranty. Section 2-318’s answers 30 to the
question of when third parties can enforce warranties arising from sale
of goods contracts 31 made by others are based on a public policy of
balancing the protection of third parties from defective products, and the
protection of sellers from unlimited liability. Section 2-318 does not
look to the intention of the parties and is not based on cases like
Lawrence v. Fox. 32
Courts continue to have problems applying the common law’s
answers to the question of when third parties have rights under
contracts—answers based on the intention of the parties and cases like
Lawrence v. Fox. And so, like Jesse Lilienthal in volume 1 of the
Harvard Law Review, we first try to explain Lawrence v. Fox.

27. There are contracts casebooks that do not even have an index entry for “privity.” See, e.g.,
RANDY BARNETT, CONTRACTS (4th ed. 2008); DAVID G. EPSTEIN, BRUCE A. MARKELL &
LAWRENCE PONOROFF, CONTRACTS: MAKING AND DOING DEALS (4th ed. 2014). The absence of
“privity” from the index is more of a commentary on the “quality” of the index prepared by one of
the co-authors than the book’s coverage of third party beneficiary law prepared by a different one of
the co-authors.
28. U.C.C. § 2-318 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
29. See, e.g., David G. Epstein, Strict Liability in Tort: A Modest Proposal, 70 W. VA. L. REV 1,
7–11 (1967).
30. UCC § 2-318 provides three alternative balances. Happily, an article comparing the various
versions of the Uniform Commercial Code’s section 2-318 with the various versions of the common
law of third party beneficiary has already been written. See Gary Monserud, Blending the Law of
Sales with the Common Law of Third Party Beneficiary, 39 DUQ. L. REV. 111 (2000).
31. We use the qualifying term “arising from sale of goods contracts” because neither UCC § 2314’s implied warranty of merchantability nor UCC § 2-315’s implied warranty of fitness depends
on the intention of the parties. U.C.C. §§ 2-314–15 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N 2002).
32. In a review of section 2-318, the Permanent Editorial Board Study Group called the third
party beneficiary analysis for extension of warranties “a fiction.” PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR
THE UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, AM. LAW INST. & NAT’L CONFERENCE OF COMM’RS ON UNIF.
STATE LAWS, PEB STUDY GROUP UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 2: PRELIMINARY
REPORT, pt. 3, at 110 (1990).
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Lawrence v. Fox

Most law review commentaries begin the discussion of third party
beneficiary law with the facts 33 of Lawrence v. Fox, 34 an 1859 35 case.
Often referred to as the “landmark” third party beneficiary case,36
Lawrence v. Fox involved a third party who was a creditor of the
promisee and was expressly named in the contract. Lawrence had loaned
$300 to Holly. 37 The next day, Holly loaned the same amount of money
to Fox. 38 In return, Fox agreed to repay the $300 loan from Holly by
paying Lawrence, thus extinguishing Holly’s $300 debt to Lawrence. 39
When Fox failed to pay the $300 to Lawrence, Lawrence sued Fox for
breach of contract. 40 The jury found for the plaintiff Lawrence. A
divided Court of Appeals affirmed. 41
There was no dispute about intent in Lawrence v. Fox. The only fact
disputed by the defendant Fox was the existence of Holly’s debt to the
plaintiff Lawrence. 42 The appellate court concluded that there was
“clearly competent” evidence of this debt.43
The dispute in Lawrence v. Fox was over the legal significance of an
undisputed fact—that Lawrence was not a party to the contract, i.e., “the
33. Professor Lawrence Cunningham explains why he begins his discussion of third party
beneficiary law: “[e]ach formulation of a legal rule depends on the facts of the case germinating the
rule . . . .” Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Common Law as an Iterative Process, 81 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 747, 750 (2006).
34. 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
35. 1859 was thus not only the year for On the Origin of the Species but also the origins of third
party beneficiary law. CHARLES DARWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF THE SPECIES (1859).
36. Schaefer v. Aetna Life & Casualty Co., 910 F. Supp. 1095, 1099 n.14 (D. Md. 1986); JOSEPH
M. PERILLO, CALAMARI & PERILLO ON CONTRACTS 578 (6th ed. 2009). But see CORBIN, supra note
24, at § 827. (“Lawrence v. Fox, can hardly . . . be said to have created a new rule of law.”). Of
course, a case can be a “landmark” even though it does not create a new rule of law. Consider, for
example, the law review descriptions of Alaska Packers’ Ass’n. v. Domenico, 117 F. 99 (9th Cir.
1902), an opinion that not only relies on but liberally quotes from two prior cases. Paul F. Kirgis,
Bargaining with Consequences, Leverage and Coercion in Negotiations, 19 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV.
69, 123 (2014) (describing Alaska Packers as the “most famous case of this type”); Rachel ArnowRichman, The Role of Contract in the Modern Employment Relationship, 10 TEX. WESLEYAN L.
REV. 1, 7 (2003) (“chestnut case”).
37. Lawrence, 20 N.Y. at 269.
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id. For an extended discussion of the facts of Lawrence v. Fox, see Anthony Jon Waters, The
Property in the Promise: A Study of the Third Party Beneficiary Rule, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1109,
1116–48 (1985).
42. Lawrence, 20 N.Y. at 269.
43. Id. at 270.
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want of privity between the plaintiff and defendant.” 44 The defendant
Fox contended that under New York law, only a contract party could
maintain an action on a contract, except in the case of a trust. 45 The
majority opinion rejects this contention, stating “a promise made to one
for the benefit of another, he for whose benefit it is made may bring an
action for its breach” 46 and concludes, “if . . . a more strict and
technically accurate application of the rules would lead to a different
result . . . the effort should not be made in the face of manifest justice.” 47
The opinion does not provide a legal principle based explanation for
its less “strict and technically accurate application of the rules” of privity
or when courts should be less “strict and technically accurate.” 48 What is
the “manifest justice” of Lawrence’s claim? Is it anything more than that
a debt was owed to him, and the contract between Fox and Holly
provided for the payment of that debt?
The “manifest justice” in Lawrence v. Fox becomes more
understandable by slightly changing the facts. Assume that Lawrence
National Bank makes a home loan to Holly. Fox later buys the house
from Holly and agrees to assume the mortgage, i.e., Fox promises to
make the mortgage payments to Lawrence National Bank.
If Fox later breaches this contract with Holly and fails to make the
mortgage payments to Lawrence National Bank, Lawrence National
Bank has contract-law rights under this contract it did not make. A rule
recognizing the contract rights of a third party when that party is a
creditor of the promisee and is expressly named in the contract is easy to
understand, and easy to apply. This is “manifest justice.”
There is nothing in the majority opinion in Lawrence v. Fox to
suggest that it should be limited to creditor third parties. And there are
later New York cases recognizing the contract rights of third parties

44. Id. at 271.
45. Id. at 270 (based on a narrow reading of an earlier case, Farley v. Cleveland, 4 Cow. 432
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1825), aff’d, 9 Cow. 639 (N.Y. 1827)).
46. Id. at 274–75. In a concurring opinion, two of the six justices in the majority stated a different
basis for the decision. Id. at 275. Holly was making the contract as an agent for Lawrence and since
Lawrence was a disclosed principal, Lawrence could enforce the contract. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF AGENCY § 292 (AM. LAW INST. 1958).
47. Lawrence, 20 N.Y. at 275 (emphasis added).
48. Vrooman v. Turner, 69 N.Y. 280, 284 (1887) (“Judges have differed as to the principle upon
which Lawrence v. Fox and kindred cases rest.”).
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other than creditors. The most frequently referenced of these cases 49 is
Seaver v. Ransom. 50
C.

Seaver v. Ransom

In the 1918 New York case Seaver v. Ransom, Miss Seaver, the third
party, was the niece of the promisee, Mrs. Beman. 51 The promisee’s
husband, Judge Beman, made “an unqualified promise on a valuable
consideration to make provision for the third party by will.” 52 Later
Judge Beman “came to die” 53 and, notwithstanding the promise to his
wife, his will made no provision for her niece. 54 The third party niece
sued Ransom, the representative of Judge Beman’s estate, alleging
breach of contract by Judge Beman. 55
The Court of Appeals relied on Lawrence v. Fox and its progeny in
ruling for the third party niece. 56 In an effort to distill a doctrinal test
from these cases, the court identified four classes of cases in which the
New York courts had recognized third party contract rights and found
room in one of the classes for Miss Seaver.
Three 57 of the Seaver v. Ransom categories focused on the
relationship between the promisee and the third party: (1) cases like
Lawrence v. Fox in which there was a debtor-creditor relationship
between the promisee and the beneficiary; (2) cases in which the
promisee had both a donative intent and a close family relationship with
the third party; and (3) cases described as “public contracts”, i.e.,
49. See CHRISTINA L. KUNZ & CAROL L. CHOMSKY, CONTRACTS: A CONTEMPORARY APPROACH
1107–16 (2010) (“Third-party beneficiary doctrine developed from the two early New York cases
below.” (Lawrence v. Fox and Seaver v. Ransom)).
50. 120 N.E. 639 (N.Y. 1918).
51. Id. at 642.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 640.
54. Id. at 639–40.
55. Id. at 640.
56. Cf. Douglass G. Boshkoff, More Selected Poems on the Law of Contracts: Raintree County
Memorial Library Occasional Paper No. 2, 91 NW. U. L. REV. 295, 301 (1996) (And if there ever
has been an appropriate footnote for the use of “cf.”, this is it.).
Beman, J. failed to honor his word
To his wife for the good of a third.
When the court made him pay,
The old judge had his say.
‘But for Fox, this would not have occurred.’
57. Seaver describes the fourth category as “cases where, at the request of a party to the contract,
the promise runs directly to the beneficiary although he does not furnish the consideration.” 120
N.E. at 641.
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contracts that a government entity made to “protect its inhabitants by
covenants for their benefit.” 58 One of the “public contract” cases cited
by Seaver v. Ransom involved a contract between a village and a private
water company to provide water to the residents of the village. 59 The
court placed Miss Seaver in the second category and labeled her a
“donee beneficiary.” 60 This is a term that is still in use and warrants
further explanation.
Just as the assumed home mortgage is a clearer paradigm for creditor
beneficiaries than Lawrence v. Fox, a life insurance contract is a clearer
paradigm for donee beneficiaries than Seaver v. Ransom. Assume that
Mrs. Beman instead uses “valuable consideration” to buy life insurance
from the Ransom Life Insurance Co. (RLI). The life insurance policy, a
contract between Mrs. Beman and RLI, names Mrs. Beman’s niece,
Miss Seaver, as the beneficiary. If RLI breaches this contract with Mrs.
Beman by failing to make the promised policy benefits payment to Miss
Seaver, then Miss Seaver has contract law rights under the life insurance
contract she did not make. A rule recognizing the contract rights of a
third party who was a donee of the promisee when that party was
expressly named in the contract is easy to understand, and easy to apply.
Around this time, courts in states other than New York were writing
about contract rights of third parties. 61 And so were the two leading
contracts law professors of the era, Samuel Williston and Arthur Corbin.
D.

Williston and Corbin

Williston wrote about contract rights of third parties in a 1902 law
review article 62 and in his 1920 treatise on contracts. 63 Williston began
his 1902 article with the following quote:
In no department of the law has a more obstinate and persistent
battle between practice and theory been waged than in regard to
the answer to the question: Whether a right of action accrues to a
third person from a contract made by others for his benefit? Nor
is the strife ended; for if it be granted that the scale inclines in

58. Id. at 640–41.
59. Id. at 640; see Pond v. New Rochelle Water Co., 76 N.E. 211 (N.Y. 1906).
60. Id. at 642.
61. See, e.g., W. H. Page, Beneficiary Contracts in Wisconsin, 1 WISC. L. REV. 216 (1922).
62. Samuel Williston, Contracts for the Benefit of a Third Person, 15 HARV. L. REV. 767 (1902).
63. E.g., SAMUEL WILLISTON, THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 381 et seq. (1920) [hereinafter
WILLISTON]. There are three later editions of this book. The 1920 edition is the only edition
authored solely by Williston. All our references to “Williston” will be to this first edition.
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favor of practice, yet the advocates of this result are continually
endeavoring to extend the territory which they have conquered
and to apply the doctrines thereby established to cases which
should be governed by other principles. 64
In our opinion, Williston’s primary “other principle” was privity.
Unlike Lilienthal, Williston did not believe that privity had been
“exploded” by Lawrence v. Fox. 65 Because of privity, Williston viewed
recognition of third party contract rights as a theoretical “anomaly.” 66 In
both his article and his treatise, Williston grudgingly supported contract
rights for donee beneficiaries, 67 some creditor beneficiaries, 68 and some
persons who benefit from contract with a municipality. 69
Corbin expressed a very different view of privity and third party
contract rights in six law review articles published from 1916 to 1930. 70
The first of Corbin’s articles begins:
By the great weight of authority in the United States the same
facts that operate to create contractual relations between the
offeror and the acceptor may also operate to create rights in a
third person. . . . To many students and practitioners of the
common law privity of contract became a fetish. As such, it
operated to deprive many a claimant of a remedy in cases where
according to the mores of the time the claim was just. 71

64. Williston, supra note 62, at 767.
65. WILLISTON, supra note 63, § 357 (“The beneficiary is not a party to a contract, and apart from
some special principal (sic) governing this class of cases cannot maintain an action.”).
66. Discussion of Tentative Draft, Contracts, Restatement No. 3, 5 A.L.I. PROC. 373, 385 (1927).
In his treatise, Williston characterized the rights of third parties to contracts as equitable, not legal.
WILLISTON, supra note 63, § 358. (“Common-law procedure contemplates but two sides to a case,
and cannot well deal with more. Equity can deal successfully with any number of conflicting
interests in one case . . . .”).
67. WILLISTON, supra note 63, § 357; Williston, supra note 62, at 772.
68. WILLISTON, supra note 63, §§ 361–63; Williston, supra note 62, at 772.
69. WILLISTON, supra note 63, § 373; Williston, supra note 62, at 772. According to Williston,
these contracts between a private party and a municipality should be analyzed differently from
contracts between two private parties. Id. at 784 (“[T]he object of the promise is to benefit the
community as a whole, and the city as the representative of the community is the proper plaintiff.”).
70. Arthur Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons, 27 YALE L.J. 1008, 1008 (1918)
[hereinafter Corbin, Third Persons]; Arthur Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons in
Connecticut, 31 YALE L.J. 489, 490–492 (1922); Arthur Corbin, The Law of Third Party
Beneficiaries in Pennsylvania, 77 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 3 (1928) [hereinafter Corbin, Beneficiaries in
Pennsylvania]; Arthur Corbin, Third Parties as Beneficiaries of Contractors’ Surety Bonds, 38
YALE L.J. 1, 2–3 (1928); Arthur Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons, 46 LAW Q.
REV. 12, 12 (1930); Arthur Corbin, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Persons in the Federal
Courts, 39 YALE L.J. 601, 603 (1930).
71. Corbin, Third Persons, supra note 70, at 1008.
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In these law review articles, Corbin advocated: (1) the total
abandonment of a privity requirement; 72 (2) the same legal treatment for
creditor and donee beneficiaries; 73 and (3) intent of the contracting
parties as the test for third party contract rights.74 Additionally, Corbin
proselytized for the judicial acceptance of the Restatement of Contracts
position on contract rights of third parties. 75
E.

First Restatement

Williston was the reporter for the Restatement of Contracts. 76 Corbin
was given the title of “Special Adviser.” 77
Legal scholars are divided as to whether Chapter 6 of the
Restatement—“Contractual Rights of Persons Not Parties to the
Contract”—is based on the views of Williston or the views of Corbin. 78
We believe that it can be read as a fusion of Williston and Corbin’s
views.
On the surface, the Restatement seems simply to mirror Williston’s
treatise. The Restatement, like Williston’s treatise, employed categories
to identify third parties with contract rights—seemingly, the same
categories as Williston’s: donee beneficiaries and creditor beneficiaries
under private contracts covered in Restatement section 133,79 and
beneficiaries under service contracts made with villages or other
governmental entities covered in Restatement section 145. 80
72. Corbin, Beneficiaries in Pennsylvania, supra note 70, at 3 (“[I]t is time to abandon the
repetition of the misleading doctrine.”).
73. Id. at 21 (“[T]he question is where to draw the line between beneficiaries with rights and third
parties as to whom performance might be beneficial but who have no rights.”).
74. Corbin, Third Persons, supra note 70, at 1009 (“The reasons for recognizing the rights in the
contract beneficiary are substantially the same as those recognizing the rights of a cestui que trust.
By so doing, the intention of the parties is carried out and the beneficiary’s just expectations are
fulfilled.” (first emphasis added)).
75. Corbin, Beneficiaries in Pennsylvania, supra note 70, at 2–3.
76. Discussion of Tentative Draft, supra note 66, at 373.
77. See Bibliography of the Published Writings of Arthur Linton Corbin, 74 YALE L.J. 311, 320
(1964).
78. Compare Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1376 (“followed the view of Williston”), with
FREDERICH KESSLER, GRANT GILMORE & ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, CONTRACTS CASES AND
MATERIALS 1362 (3d ed. 1986) (“almost certainly the handiwork of Arthur Corbin”). But cf.
Waters, supra note 41, at 1166–67 (“Corbin claims . . . that his views prevailed over Williston in the
formulation of the chapters on third party beneficiaries in the First Restatement.”).
79. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 133 (AM. LAW INST. 1932).
80. The last category, government, is dealt with separately from the other two. See id. § 145.
RESTATEMENT § 145, like Seaver v. Ransom, uses the example of a private company’s contracting
with a municipality to provide sufficient water to maintain needed pressure in fire hydrants. Id.
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Neither the text of Restatement section 145, nor the “Comment” or
“Illustrations” following it, use the terms “creditor beneficiary” or
“donee beneficiary.” The comment to section 145 describes it as a
“special application of the principles stated in section 133.” 81 Both the
illustrations to section 145 and later cases suggest that, at best, section
145 governing third party rights under “government contracts” 82 is a
“[very, very] special application of the principles stated in Restatement
section 133” 83 that govern third party rights under private contracts.
One of section 145’s illustrations is similar to a case included in many
contracts casebooks, H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water Co. 84 There,
the City of Rensselaer contracted with the defendant water company to
provide enough water to have sufficient water pressure at the hydrant. 85
The plaintiff’s warehouse burned down because the defendant failed to
maintain adequate pressure. The plaintiff sued, alleging, inter alia, “[a]
cause of action for breach of contract within Lawrence v. Fox.” 86 The
court, in an opinion by Judge Cardozo, rejected the third party
beneficiary claim. 87
Although Cardozo’s H.R. Moch opinion mentions Lawrence v. Fox, 88
all of the cases it discussed and relied on involved government contracts.
The same statement can be made about Astra USA Inc. v. Santa Clara
County, 89 a 2011 United States Supreme Court decision denying the
right to bring a breach of contract action as third party beneficiaries of a
contract between federal government and drug manufacturers.
Courts treat third parties’ suits to enforce government contracts
differently from third parties’ suits to enforce contracts between private
parties. 90 This Article focuses on what courts do and should do when a
third party sues to enforce a contract between private parties.

81. Id. § 145 cmt. a.
82. The government contracts that raise third party issues are different from the typical
government contract, which is simply a procurement contract—e.g., government entity contracts to
buy widgets. Third party issues arise in the atypical contract in which a government entity contracts
with a private entity to provide services to the public. See id. § 145 cmt. a, illus. 1–5.
83. Id. § 145 cmt. a (emphasis added).
84. 159 N.E. 896 (N.Y. 1928).
85. Id. at 896.
86. Id. at 897.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 898.
89. 563 U.S. 110 (2011).
90. GECCMC 2005-C1 Plummer St. Office Ltd. P’ship. v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat’l Ass’n,
671 F.3d 1027, 1034 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[H]eightened standard required of third-party beneficiaries to
government contracts.”); see also Geis, supra note 9, at 1157 n.20 (Government contracts “present
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Under the First Restatement, a third party has contract rights under a
contract made by other private parties if they were a “creditor
beneficiary” or a “donee beneficiary.” 91 If the third party does not come
within the Restatement’s “creditor beneficiary” or “donee beneficiary”
categories, then she is in the “incidental beneficiary” category and has
no contract law rights. 92
On a closer reading of the Restatement’s description of “donee
beneficiary,” in section 133(1)(a), we see Corbin’s influence. Even
though “donee beneficiary” is a term used in Williston’s treatise and in
cases such as Seaver v. Ransom, the Restatement uses the term “donee
beneficiary” differently. 93
Under Restatement section 133(1)(a), a third party has contract rights
if “it appears from the terms of the promise in view of the accompanying
circumstances that the purpose of the promisee . . . is to make a gift to
the beneficiary or to confer upon him a right against the promisor.” 94
Thus, a third party who was not a donee would still have contract rights
if a reasonable person would believe that was “the purpose of the
promisee.” 95
While section 133 does not use the term “reasonable person,” it does
use the word “appears.” 96 The First Restatement is making an objective
test for intent—an outsider’s view of the promisee’s purpose.
This focus on the intent of a contracting party, rather than the status of
the third party, is consistent with what Corbin advocated in his six law
review articles that preceded the first Restatement. The Restatement
different legal issues from private contracting and involve considerations more closely related to the
determination of private rights of action in statutory interpretation.”). But cf. Eisenberg, supra note
8, at 1406–07 (acknowledging that courts treat suits by third parties under government contracts as
“special” and raise “particularly difficult third-party beneficiary problems” but concluding “[t]here
is no more reason to apply a categorical rule to government contracts than to any other contracts.”).
91. See generally RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 133–35 (AM. LAW INST. 1932).
92. Id. §§ 133(1)(c), 147.
93. The Restatement also uses the term “creditor beneficiary” differently from Williston and prior
cases. In Lawrence v. Fox, the defendant promisor Fox moved for nonsuit on the ground “[t]hat
there was no proof tending to show that Holly was indebted to the plaintiff.” 20 N.Y 268, 269
(1859). The court found that there was competent evidence of the debtor-creditor relationship. Id. at
270. No such finding was required by the Restatement. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS
§ 133 (AM. LAW INST. 1932). A person can be a “creditor beneficiary” as that term is used in the
Restatement even if she is not actually a creditor of the promise: a “supposed or asserted duty”
sufficed. Id. If Holly tells Fox that Holly owes Lawrence money and contracts with Fox to pay
Lawrence, then Lawrence can enforce the contract regardless of whether Lawrence was actually
Holly’s creditor.
94. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 133 (AM. LAW INST. 1932).
95. Id.
96. Id.
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provisions are not, however, consistent with the case law in most states
before the release of the First Restatement. In his multivolume treatise
published in 1951, Corbin described the provisions as “working rules
based upon the judicial ‘trend’” 97 and acknowledged that “it cannot be
said that the rules represent the old ‘common law’ or that they are in
exact harmony with the law of any jurisdiction.” 98
Nor are the provisions of the First Restatement consistent with the
case law in most states after the release of the First Restatement.
Because of the Restatement’s “creditor beneficiary” and “donee
beneficiary” nomenclature, some courts recognized contract rights only
in third parties who were indeed creditors or actual donees. 99 Still other
courts found the Restatement provisions unhelpful in identifying which
third parties, other than creditors and actual donees, had contract
rights. 100
F.

Second Restatement

In his 1951 treatise, Corbin suggested that the terms “creditor
beneficiary” and “donee beneficiary” be replaced with the single term
“intended beneficiary.” 101 The Restatement Second of Contracts
(hereinafter “Restatement Second”) followed this suggestion.102

97. CORBIN, supra note 24, at 4.
98. Id.; see also Ira P. Hildebrand, Contracts for the Benefit of Third Parties in Texas, 9 TEXAS L.
REV. 125 (1931).
99. See, e.g., Insbrandtsen Co. v. Local 1291 of Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 204 F.2d 495, 498
(3d Cir. 1953) (holding that third party was not a donee beneficiary because “this fact
situation . . . completely negatives a gift transaction under any possible interpretation of that term.”);
United States v. Minnesota, 123 F. Supp. 488, 497 (D. Minn. 1953); see also JOHN EDWARD
MURRAY, JR., MURRAY ON CONTRACTS 853 (5th ed. 2011) (“Because of the ‘donee’
characterization, however, the . . . beneficiary under this category who was not a true ‘donee’ could
be easily ignored by courts who would limit this compartment to third parties who could
demonstrate a promisee’s donative intent.”).
100. See, e.g., Moore Constr. Co. v. Clarksville Dept. of Elec., 707 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1985) (noting that the Tennessee Supreme Court had adopted the Restatement position on third
party beneficiaries, and stating, “[t]his process, however, has not been uniformly acceptable, and
there have been a number of cases where this rationale has been ignored in order to enable the court
to permit a person to maintain an action as a third party beneficiary.”); Gary Monserud, supra note
30, at 122(“[W]hatever its deficiencies, section 133 of the Restatement First and its related sections
performed an enormous service for contract law. The widespread hesitancy about allowing third
party suits on contracts . . . disappeared. . . . The recurring question was: In what type of case is
allowing a third party beneficiary suit appropriate?”).
101. CORBIN, supra note 24, at 8 (“It might be supposed that the one essential classification of
beneficiaries should be ‘intended’ beneficiaries and ‘unintended’ ones.”).
102. For an account of Corbin’s role in and impact on the American Law Institute’s work on third
party beneficiary law, see Waters, supra note 7, at 1148–73. Unfortunately, Corbin’s account of his
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The introductory note to the Restatement Second’s chapter 14,
“Contract Beneficiaries,” states that the terms “creditor beneficiary” and
“donee beneficiary” “carry overtones of obsolete doctrinal difficulties”
and so the terms “are avoided in the statement of rules.” 103 Instead, the
operative terms are “intended beneficiary” and “incidental
beneficiary.” 104
If a third party comes within the definition of “intended beneficiary,”
she has contract rights. 105 Section 302 provides the following definition
of “intended beneficiary”:
(1) Unless otherwise agreed between promisor and promisee, a
beneficiary of a promise is an intended beneficiary if recognition
of a right to performance in the beneficiary is appropriate to
effectuate the intention of the parties and either
(a) the performance of the promise will satisfy an obligation of
the promisee to pay money to the beneficiary; or
(b) the circumstances indicate that the promisee intends to give
the beneficiary the benefit of the promised performance. 106
There is also language in comment d 107 to Restatement 302 that seems
to suggest that a third party’s reasonable reliance is a basis for
role in and impact on the American Law Institute’s work on third party beneficiary law has been
lost. See generally Scott D. Gerber, An Ivy League Mystery: The Lost Papers of Arthur Linton
Corbin, 53 S.C. L. REV. 605 (2002).
103. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 14, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1981). In
looking at third party beneficiary law at about the same time as the American Law Institute,
Professors Grant Gilmore and Frederick Kessler saw the social evolution, not doctrine or rules:
In our own century we have witnessed what it does not seem too fanciful to describe as a
socialization of our theory of contract. The progressive expansion of the range of non-parties
allowed to sue as contract beneficiaries . . . is one of the entries to make in this ledger.
FREDERICK KESSLER & GRANT GILMORE, CONTRACTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 1118 (2d ed.
1970).
104. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS ch. 14, intro. note (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
105. Id. § 304.
106. Id. § 302 (emphasis added).
107. Id. § 302 cmt. d (“Other intended beneficiaries. Either a promise to pay the promisee’s debt
to a beneficiary or a gift promise involves a manifestation of intention by the promisee and promisor
sufficient, in a contractual setting, to make reliance by the beneficiary both reasonable and probable.
Other cases may be quite similar in this respect. Examples are a promise to perform a supposed or
asserted duty of the promisee, a promise to discharge a lien on the promisee’s property, or a promise
to satisfy the duty of a third person. In such cases, if the beneficiary would be reasonable in relying
on the promise as manifesting an intention to confer a right on him, he is an intended beneficiary.
Where there is doubt whether such reliance would be reasonable, considerations of procedural
convenience and other factors not strictly dependent on the manifested intention of the parties may
affect the question whether under Subsection (1) recognition of a right in the beneficiary is
appropriate. In some cases an overriding policy, which may be embodied in a statute, requires
recognition of such a right without regard to the intention of the parties.”) (second emphasis added).
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concluding that the third party is an “intended beneficiary.” We believe
that this language in comment d is relatively insignificant for the
following reasons:
The word “reliance” does not appear in the text of section 302.
The comments appended to a Restatement section, like the comments
to a statute such as the Uniform Commercial Code, have a limited
purpose—explanation of what is in the black letter of the section. 108
The words of comment d do not support the proposition that a third
party’s reliance on one of the contracting parties’ promise is a separate
basis for the third party’s contract rights. Instead they seem to say that
such reliance is a basis for concluding that the contracting parties
intended to benefit the third party: “[I]f the beneficiary would be
reasonable in relying on the promise as manifesting an intention to
confer a right on him, he is an intended beneficiary.” 109
We use the weasel word “seem” because we are somewhat uncertain
in our understanding of the quoted words and are even less certain as to
how the reliance of C to the words of A and B provides an independent
basis for ascertaining A and B’s intent.
The Restatement Second separates contract rights based on the
bargain of two parties from contract rights based on the reliance of one
person. 110
Restatement Second section 90, discussing promissory estoppel,
provides an independent basis for granting third parties contract rights
because of their reliance. Section 90 begins: “A promise which the
promisor should reasonably expect to induce action or forbearance on
the part of the promisee or a third party . . . is binding if injustice can be
avoided only by enforcement of the promise.” 111
Thus, if the promisee or a third party relies on Restatement Second
section 90, they can recover only if they can prove not only reasonable
reliance but also “injustice.” 112 Comment d to Restatement Second

108. AM. LAW INST., CAPTURING THE VOICE OF THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: A HANDBOOK
42 (rev. ed. 2015).
109. Id.
110. In essence, Restatement (Second) of Contracts section 17 sets out two different bases for
contract: bargain and reliance. Compare section 17(1) with section 17(2): “(1) Except as stated in
Subsection (2), the formation of a contract requires a bargain in which there is a manifestation of
mutual assent to the exchange and a consideration. (2) Whether or not there is a bargain a contract
may be formed under special rules applicable to formal contracts or under the rules stated in §§ 82–
94.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
111. Id. § 90 (emphasis added).
112. Id.
FOR ALI REPORTERS AND THOSE WHO REVIEW THEIR WORK
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section 302 makes no mention of “injustice.” 113 It should not be easier
for a third party to recover because of reliance under Restatement
Second section 302 than for either a third party or a promisee to recover
because of reliance under Restatement Second section 90.
For the above seven reasons, this Article deals only with third party
contract rights based on the bargain between two other parties. 114
Returning then to our focus on the language of section 302 set out
above, we think it is instructive to compare the two underscored phrases:
intention of the parties and promisee’s intent. The difference in the two
phrases creates the question of whose intention is relevant: “the parties”
or “the promisee.”
Professor E. Allan Farnsworth, one of the reporters for the
Restatement Second, acknowledged, “[i]n view of the Restatement
Second’s requirement that a right in the beneficiary be ‘appropriate to
effectuate the intention of the parties,’ its additional requirement that the
promisee have an intention to benefit the third person seems curious at
first.” 115 He then suggests that the phrase “promisee intends” be
“paraphrased to require an indication ‘that the promisee would have
been willing to pay the fair value for the promisor’s undertaking a duty
to the beneficiary.’” 116
We are not sure that Professor Farnsworth was using the term
“paraphrase” in the same way we do. We are sure that no reported case
has used Professor Farnsworth’s “paraphrase.”
Some paraphrasing may in fact be necessary to bring Restatement
Second section 302 in line with the objective theory of contract
formation and interpretation. 117 Compare both of the subjective
underscored phrases in Restatement Second section 302, “intention of
the parties” and “promisee intends,” 118 with the objective Restatement
First section 133 phrase “appears from the terms of the promise in view
of the accompanying circumstances that the purpose of the promisee.” 119

113. Id. at cmt. d.
114. For an article on third party contract rights based on promissory estoppel, see Michael B.
Metzger & Michael J. Phillips, Promissory Estoppel and Third Parties, 42 SW. L.J. 931 (1988).
115. 3 E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, FARNSWORTH ON CONTRACTS 23 (2d ed. 1998).
116. Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
117. For the most part, contract law looks to the objective intent, rather than subjective intent.
See, e.g., Indus. Am., Inc. v. Fulton Indus., Inc., 285 A.2d 412, 415 (Del. 1971) (“[O]vert
manifestation of assent—not subjective intent—controls the formation of a contract.”); see
generally GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 42–43 (2d ed. 1995).
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 302 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
119. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 133 (AM. LAW INST. 1932).

09 - Epstein.docx (Do Not Delete)

1682

12/20/2016 12:59 PM

WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 91:1663

The words “appears,” “terms,” and “circumstances” in the
Restatement First are consistent with an objective test of the promisee’s
intent: what would a reasonable person understand the promisee to
intend? The words “the intention” in Restatement Second section 302
are more consistent with a subjective inquiry into the actual intent of the
parties (or promisee).
Some courts have stated that omission of the terms “creditor
beneficiary” and “donee beneficiary” is the only difference between
Restatement Second section 302 and Restatement First section 133. 120
Even more courts have continued to use the Restatement First terms
“creditor beneficiary” and “donee beneficiary.” 121 There are of course
cases that use Restatement Second’s “intended beneficiary” and
“incidental beneficiary” language.
Regardless of what language courts use, it is difficult to reconcile
courts’ resolution of cases in which the understanding of both parties to
the contract is less obvious than in Lawrence v. Fox and Seaver v.
Ransom. There is little consistency in those cases because of the inherent
vagueness in the questions of (1) whose intent is relevant and (2) how
that intent should be defined and proved.
II.

REVIEW OF CURRENT CASES: CONFUSION AS TO WHERE
WE ARE

Where we are analytically with respect to third party contract rights
depends very much on where the litigants are geographically. We
120. See, e.g., Lake Almanor Assocs. L.P. v. Huffman-Broadway Grp., Inc., 101 Cal. Rptr. 3d 71,
75 n.2 (Cal. Ct. App. 2009) (“Section 302 of the Restatement Second of Contracts omits the terms
‘donee beneficiary’ and ‘creditor beneficiary,’ instead employing the term ‘intended beneficiary’ for
a beneficiary with enforceable rights and ‘incidental beneficiary’ for a beneficiary lacking such
rights. However, the basic framework regarding which third parties can enforce contracts is
unchanged.”) (citation omitted); Lovell Land, Inc. v. State Highway Admin., 969 A.2d 284, 297
(Md. 2009) (The change made in the Second Restatement “was not one of substance, but only of
terminology.”); see also Prince, supra note 10, at 990 (“[M]any courts have not perceived any
change.”).
121. See, e.g., MCI Telecoms. Corp. v. Tex. Utils. Elec. Co., 995 S.W.2d 647, 651 (Tex. 1999)
(plaintiff must show that he is either a donee or a creditor beneficiary); Cory H. Howard, Towards a
Broader Understanding of Privity Exceptions in Contract Law: Bestowing Limited Rights on
Incidental Third Party Beneficiaries in Construction Litigation to Fulfill Public Policy Objectives,
51 GONZ. L. REV. 187, 205 (2015–16) (“Most, if not all, common law recognizes two discrete
categories of intended third-party beneficiaries who can enforce a contract to which they are not
privity: (1) a donee beneficiary and (2) a creditor beneficiary.”); see also 13 SAMUEL WILLISTON &
RICHARD A. LORD, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS §§ 32–33 (4th ed. 2000) (“[T]he vast
majority of courts continue to speak of third party creditor and third party donee beneficiaries when
considering protected beneficiaries.”); STEVEN J. BURTON, PRINCIPLES OF CONTRACT LAW 616 (4th
ed. 2012) (“[R]emains embedded in the law of many jurisdictions . . . .”).
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conducted a fifty state and federal court survey of cases from 2010 to
January 1, 2016 that considered whether third parties had contract rights.
We focused on the questions: (1) whose intent was relevant and (2) what
intent was relevant. We also looked for differences between the damages
earned by a third party beneficiary and the damages that would have
been awarded to the promisee of the contract. We found no discernible
majority rules.
A.

Whose Intent Is Relevant?

We divided the recent cases into three categories: (1) cases that focus
on the promisee’s intent; (2) cases that focus on the promisor’s intent;
and (3) cases that look to the intent of both the promisor and the
promisee. The following cases are representative of these three answers
to the question: whose intent is relevant?
1.

Promisee’s Intent

In Logan-Baldwin v. L.S.M. General Contractors, Inc., 122 New York
homeowners hired L.S.M. General Contractors, Inc. (LSM) to perform
restorative work on their house. 123 LSM, in turn, hired Henry Isaacs, a
subcontractor, to help with roofing. 124 Henry Isaacs then hired Hal
Brewster to assist him with the project.125 Unfortunately, Hal Brewster
“botched” the job and caused extensive damage to the house. 126 LSM
and Isaacs attempted to fix the damage, but ultimately abandoned the
project, leaving the homeowners to address it themselves. 127
The homeowners sued their general contractor LSM and
subcontractor Isaacs for breach of contract.128 While the homeowners
received judgment against LSM, the court granted Isaacs’s motion for
summary judgment. 129 The appeal involved only Isaacs’ summary
judgment and the appellate court reversed and remanded. 130
Isaacs contended that the homeowners did not have standing to
enforce its subcontract with LSM because: (1) there was no privity of
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

94 A.D.3d 1466, 1466 (N.Y. App. Div. 2012).
Id. at 1466–67.
Id.
Id. at 1467.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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contract and (2) the homeowners were not intended third party
beneficiaries of the subcontract between LSM and Isaacs.131 The court
held that the homeowners were intended third party beneficiaries to the
contract, and therefore had standing against the promisee Isaacs.132
The opinion states that generally:
An obligation rooted in contract may [nevertheless] engender a
duty owed to those not in privity when the contracting party
knows that the subject matter of a contract is intended for the
benefit of others . . . . An intention to benefit a third party must
be gleaned from the contract as a whole. 133
Thus, privity is not always required.
The opinion goes on to say that homeowners who are
asserting third-party beneficiary rights under a contract must
establish ‘(1) the existence of a valid and binding contract
between other parties, (2) that the contract was intended for [the
third party’s] benefit and (3) that the benefit to [the third party]
is sufficiently immediate, rather than incidental, to indicate the
assumption by the contracting parties of a duty to compensate
[the third party] if the benefit is lost.’ 134
The opinion states that the focus is solely on the intent of the
promisee, LSM. 135 The explanation for focusing solely on the intent of
the promisee was that “the promisee procured the promise by furnishing
the consideration therefor.” 136
The opinion provides no explanation as to why the “promisee [LSM]
furnishing the consideration therefor” 137 should affect the liability of the
promisor, Isaacs. Instead, the court provides citations to prior opinions,
which are no more fully reasoned, stating that the focus is on the intent
of the promisees. 138
The remainder of the opinion in this case is more enlightening. The
court stated: “Here . . . it is ‘almost inconceivable’ that the Isaacs
defendants did not know that plaintiffs, the owners of the home, would
131. Id.
132. See id. at 1470.
133. Id. at 1468 (quoting Van Vleet v. Rhulen Agency, 180 A.D.2d 846, 848–49 (N.Y. App. Div.
1992)) (brackets in original).
134. Id. (quoting Burns Jackson Miller Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 451 N.E.2d 459, 469 (N.Y
1983)).
135. Id. at 1468.
136. Id. (quoting Drake v. Drake, 45 N.Y.S.2d 420, 422 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982)).
137. Id. at 1468.
138. Id.
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be the ultimate beneficiaries of the services being provided by the Isaacs
defendants pursuant to their contract with LSM.” 139 After stating that
LSM’s intent was determinative, the court focused on what the promisor
Isaacs had reason to know at the time of the contract.
2.

Promisor’s Intent

Several cases and a Michigan statute expressly focus on what the
promisor had reason to know. Muhammad v. Pub. Storage Co.140 is an
example of a recent case stating that the promisor’s intention is the one
that is relevant to a third party beneficiary’s status. 141 Muhammad
concerned plaintiffs Wallace and Edna Muhammad who wanted to rent a
storage unit. 142 They entered into an agreement with the defendant,
Public Storage. Wallace Muhammad signed the contract with Public
Storage as the “occupant.” 143 Edna Muhammad signed the contract as
“occupant’s authorized access person.” 144
Eventually, the Muhammads fell behind on payments, and by the end
of January were nearly two months delinquent, owing $161 to Public
Storage. 145 Public Storage then sold all of the items in the Muhammads’
storage unit. 146 When the Muhammads attempted to get reimbursement
for the near $200,000 worth of items sold, Public Storage refused, and
the Muhammads sued. 147 Public Storage filed a motion to dismiss. 148
The suit alleged several causes of action.149 Count II, a breach of
contract claim, is our only concern. 150
Defendant Public Storage filed a motion to dismiss Edna
Muhammad’s breach of contract claim, contending that Edna
Muhammad could not assert a claim for breach of contract because of
lack of privity—she was not a party to the agreement with Public
Storage. 151 In response, the Muhammads argued that Edna Muhammad
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 1469 (citations omitted).
No. 14-0246-CV-W-ODS, 2014 WL 3687328 (W.D. Mo. July 24, 2014).
Id. at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at *1–2.
Id. at *2.
Id.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *3.
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could assert a claim for breach of contract as an intended third party
beneficiary. 152
The court rejected the Muhammads’ argument and granted the Public
Storage motion to dismiss Edna Muhammad’s contract cause of
action. 153 More important than the court’s result is the court’s reasoning,
or lack thereof. The opinion states in pertinent part: “Third party
beneficiary status depends not so much on a desire or purpose to confer
a benefit on the third person, but rather on an intent that the promisor
assume a direct obligation to him.” 154 The court does not explain why
the promisor’s intent should be the determinative test. Instead, the court
simply cites an earlier case, which is no more fully reasoned.155
In some cases, it is not the case law that directs whose intent is
relevant, but a state statute. For example, Michigan’s third party
beneficiary statute provides:
Any person for whose benefit a promise is made by way of
contract, as hereinafter defined, has the same right to enforce
said promise that he would have had if the said promise had
been made directly to him as the promisee.
A promise shall be construed to have been made for the benefit
of a person whenever the promisor of said promise had
undertaken to give or to do or refrain from doing something
directly to or for said person. 156
Recent cases applying this Michigan statute, such as Shathaia v.
Travelers Causality Insurance Company of America, 157 are not helpful
in understanding the policy basis for the statute. Shathaia involved a
property insurance policy issued to a business entity. 158 The building at
issue was insured but later destroyed in a fire. 159 The building belonged
to the owner of the business entity, Shathaia, not the business entity that
was a party to the insurance contract. 160 When Shathaia sued the

152. Id. at *4.
153. Id.
154. Id. (quoting McKenzie v. Columbian Nat’l Title Ins. Co., 931 S.W.2d 843, 845 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1996)) (first emphasis added).
155. Id. at 4 (referring to McKenzie, 931 S.W.2d 843).
156. MICH. COMP. LAWS § 600.1405 (2012).
157. 984 F. Supp. 2d 714 (E.D. Mich. 2013).
158. Id. at 714.
159. Id.
160. Id.
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insurance company, it asserted rights under the insurance contract, and
the insurance company successfully moved for summary judgment. 161
In concluding that Shathaia was not an intended third party
beneficiary, the court looked to the “plain language” of the Michigan
statute. Nothing in the opinion or the cases cited in the opinion,
however, clarifies the reason for the Michigan statutory rule. 162
3.

Both Parties’ Intent

Lilley v. JP Morgan Chase 163 involved a contract between a mortgage
lender and an appraiser. The Lilleys signed a mortgage contract with JP
Morgan Chase Bank, NA (“Lender”) in 2005. 164 Prior to approving the
Lilleys’ loan, Lender contracted with Ingram, a real estate appraiser, to
appraise the home. 165 The Lilleys defaulted on their loan and sued
Ingram, alleging that Ingram breached his contract with Lender by
preparing an inflated appraisal of the home. 166
Only Lender and Ingram were parties to the appraisal contract. 167 The
Lilleys had to establish that they were intended third party beneficiaries
of that contract in order to sue for the breach of contract between Lender
and Ingram. 168
The Court explained that the existence of third party beneficiary
status is determined by examining the written contract. “The written
contract must show that the contracting parties clearly intended to
confer a separate and distinct benefit upon the third party.” 169 The Court
did not explain why it was the “contracting parties’” intent that was
relevant and not merely the intent of the promisee or the intent of the
promisor. Again, the opinion simply provided precedent, not policy.
B.

What Intent Is Relevant?

Once an attorney representing a third party to a contract knows whose
intent 170 will be relevant in determining whether their client can enforce
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.

Id.
Id at 722.
317 P.3d 470 (Utah Ct. App. 2013).
Id. at 472.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 472 (emphasis added).
Promisee, promisor, or both promisee and promisor.
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that contract, they then confront the question of what intent is relevant.
Most of the cases in our survey simply refer to an intent to benefit a third
party. Other opinions seem to require an intent that the promisor assume
a direct obligation to the third party. Still fewer courts refer to an intent
that the third party have legal rights in the contract.
1.

Intent to Benefit the Third Party

For example, in Tarr v. Narconon Fresh Start, 171 plaintiff Michael
Tarr sued Narconon for breaching a drug rehabilitation contract. 172
Michael alleged that: (1) Narconon promised a secular program based on
medical science and counseling; and that (2) during his time in the
Narconon program, he was required to study Scientology and participate
in Scientology rituals, receiving counseling only on Scientology. 173
Narconon filed a motion to dismiss based in part on the fact that
Michael was not a contracting party, i.e., he lacked privity. Narconon
had contracted with Mrs. Tarr, Michael’s mother, who was seeking
treatment for her twenty-four-year-old, heroin-addicted son.174
The court denied Narconon’s motion to dismiss. 175 The court
explained that “[u]nder Nevada law, a third party has standing to sue for
breach of contract (1) if the agreement was formed with the intent to
benefit a third party and (2) if the third party’s reliance on the agreement
was foreseeable.” 176 The court found that Ms. Tarr’s sole purpose had
been to benefit her son. 177 And, since the drug rehabilitation program
required Michael to travel to the Narconon facility, Michael’s reliance
on the contract was foreseeable. 178
What the court did not explain was the reason for its rule. The opinion
does, however, provide the requisite nexus between either the promisee
Mrs. Tarr’s intent and Narconon’s liability to Michael, or Michael’s
reliance and Narconon’s liability on a third party beneficiary theory. 179

171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

72 F. Supp. 3d 1138 (D. Nev. 2014).
Id. at 1140.
Id. at 1139.
Id. at 1142.
Id. at 1139.
Id. at 1142 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id.
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Intent to Assume a Direct Obligation

Known Litigation Holdings, LLC v. Navigators Insurance, 180 a case
involving a potential loss payee of an insurance policy, used a different
intent test to reach the same result. 181 There, the plaintiff, an assignee of
Domestic Bank, sued the defendant insurance company on an insurance
contract between the insurance company and the bank’s couriers. 182
Domestic had contracted with NECD and IMS to courier cash from the
bank to the bank’s ATMs. 183
The contract between Domestic and NECD and IMS provided that
NECD and IMS would be liable for any loss resulting from employee
malfeasance. 184 The contract required that NECD and IMS get insurance
to cover any such liability. 185 NECD and IMS contracted with
Navigators Insurance. 186 That contract included coverage of loss caused
by employee wrongdoing, and designated Domestic as the sole potential
loss payee. 187
After four years of service, a government investigation alerted
Domestic of discrepancies in the ATMs. 188 Domestic conducted its own
audit and found that employees of NECD and IMS had conspired to
defraud Domestic out of over $5 million over the course of those four
years. 189 Domestic demanded compensation from NECD and IMS. 190
When those companies did not respond, Domestic demanded
compensation directly from Navigators. 191
Navigators claimed that Domestic could not sue for breach of the
insurance policy, because Domestic was not a named insured and
therefore was not a party to that contract. 192 The court found that third
party Domestic had a right to sue as a third party beneficiary if the
parties intended that “‘the promisor should assume a direct obligation to

180.
181.
182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

934 F. Supp. 2d 409 (D. Conn. 2013).
Id. at 418.
Id. at 412.
Id. at 413.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 414.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the third party beneficiary.’” 193 Under the terms of the insurance
contract, Domestic had a right to receive direct payment from
Navigators. 194 The court found that this granted Domestic rights as a
third party beneficiary, despite language in the contract explicitly
disclaiming
rights
for
the
insured’s
designee. 195
The opinion lists several other cases that employed the same test. 196
The test states that the third party has a right to sue as a third party
beneficiary if the parties intended that “the promisor should assume a
direct obligation to the third party beneficiary.” 197 Neither this opinion,
nor prior opinions, provide an explanation for this rule.
3.

Intent to Grant the Third Party Legal Rights in the Contract

In Armbruster v. WageWorks, Inc., 198 Paul Armbruster sued
WageWorks because WageWorks fired Armbruster’s ex-wife, Lauren
Coppock, causing her to forfeit her stock options. 199 As part of
Armbruster and Coppock’s divorce agreement, Armbruster was entitled
to exercise half of Coppock’s stock options if Armbruster so directed.200
Armbruster was to provide any necessary funds ninety days before the
exercise date, and Coppock was to deliver to Armbruster title to the
resulting shares.201
Armbruster never directed Coppock to exercise his half of the
options. 202 When WageWorks terminated Coppock, neither she nor
Armbruster had the funds to exercise a majority of the stock options. 203
Thus, as the Stock Options Plan stipulated, the stock options were
forfeited three months after Coppock’s termination.204
WageWorks moved to dismiss the contract claim, citing a lack of
privity. 205 The Stock Options Plan was a contract with Coppock alone. 206
193. Id. (citing Grigerik v. Sharpe, 721 A.2d 526, 536 (Conn. 1998)).
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. 953 F. Supp. 2d 1072 (D. Ariz. 2013).
199. Id. at 1074.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss Complaint at 11, Armbruster v. WageWorks, Inc., 953 F.
Supp. 2d 1072 (D. Ariz. 2013) (No. CV-12-2058-PHX-ROS), 2012 WL 6569035.
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Armbruster alleged that he was an intended third party beneficiary of the
Stock Options Plan. 207 The court held that Armbruster was not an
intended third party beneficiary. 208 The court explained that in order for
a third party beneficiary to have standing in Arizona, the contracting
parties must:
i.

Intend to directly benefit the third party;

ii.

[i]ndicate that intent in the contract itself; and

iii.

[i]ntend to recognize the third party as the primary party in
interest and as privy to the promise. 209

Even if the contract shows an intent to benefit the third party, the
parties must also intend to recognize the third party as privy to the
promise, and thus legally able to sue for breach of contract, or the third
party does not have standing. 210
The Arizona court found no such intent in the contract between
WageWorks and Coppock, and dismissed Armbruster’s breach of
contract claim. 211 And, again, we found no explanation by the Arizona
court as to why the test for third party contract rights should be “intent to
recognize [the third party] as the primary party in interest.” 212
C.

Summary of Cases

We have used these representative cases to point out the division on
intent issues. These cases can be used to make three additional points.
First, the facts of present day cases contesting third party contract rights
are more challenging than the simple loan repayment involved in
Lawrence v. Fox or the causa mortis gift of Seaver v. Ransom. Second,
the cases are conclusory rather than reasoned. Third, the conclusions are
rooted in history rather than policy and practical consequences.

206. Armbruster, 953 F. Supp. 2d at 1074.
207. Id. at 1076.
208. Id.
209. Note that the court does not define “privy to the promise.” See id. (citing Sherman v. First
Am. Title Ins., 38 P.3d 1229, 1232 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002)).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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III. WHERE WE SHOULD BE
Nineteenth century cases and early twentieth century law review
articles on third party contract rights focused on privity and whether
privity barred a third party from recovering on a contract made by
others. In answering this question, cases like Lawrence v. Fox 213 and
Seaver v. Ransom 214 and Professor Corbin and Williston’s law review
articles 215 borrowed from trust law cases, concepts, and terminology. 216
The early cases and scholarly commentary influenced the 1932
Restatement of Contracts chapter “Contractual Rights of Persons Not
Parties to the Contract” 217 and, in turn, the comparable 1981 Restatement
Second provisions. Even the recent cases on deciding when third parties
have rights under contracts look to these early tests.
The test for deciding when third parties have legal rights under
contracts made by others should reflect the practical consequences of
that decision. The practical consequences of an affirmative decision on
the third party deemed an “intended beneficiary” are obvious—
obviously “beneficial” to the third party.
Let us consider the less obvious practical consequences of third party
contract rights on the promisee and the promisor. Everyone likes a
benefit. It is the imposition of a detriment that can be problematic.
Therefore, the focus of the courts should be on the detriment that results
from legal recognition of third party contract rights.
A.

Consequences of Third Party Contract Rights on the Promisee

Under current third party beneficiary law, an intended third party
beneficiary is in every sense a “third party,” not a new “second party.”
In other words, an intended third party beneficiary is not a replacement
for the promisee, but rather a true third party, i.e., an additional party. As
a result, deciding that a third party has contract rights against the
promisor because the third party is an intended third party beneficiary
does not affect the promisee’s contract rights. An intended third party
beneficiary transaction does not effect a transfer of contract rights. 218
213. 20 N.Y. 268 (1859); see also supra section I.B.
214. 120 N.E. 639 (N.Y. 1918); see also supra section I.C.
215. See supra section I.D.
216. E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH ET AL., CONTRACTS 927 (8th ed. 2013) (using the phrase “centered
on the law of trusts” while describing history of third party beneficiary law).
217. RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS ch. 6 (AM. LAW INST. 1932).
218. See, e.g., Campbell v. Parkway Surgery Ctr., LLC, 354 P.3d 1172, 1181 (Idaho 2015) (“[A]
promise in a third-party beneficiary contract creates a duty in the promisor to the promisee to
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That is one of the major legal differences between third party
beneficiary law and the law governing assignments. When A contracts
with B and then later A assigns her contract right to C, the assignor A no
longer has any contract rights.219 C, the assignee, replaces A, the
assignor. 220 The consequence of an assignment is that the assignee
replaces the assignor—the assignor no longer has contract law rights
against the obligor.
In third party beneficiary law, both the terminology and consequences
are different from assignment law. The promisee of a third party
beneficiary contract has the same rights as the promisee of any other
contract. 221
Reconsider the facts of our “first” third party beneficiary case,
Lawrence v. Fox. 222 Remember that Lawrence had loaned $300 to
Holly. 223 Holly then entered into a contract with Fox in which Holly
loaned $300 to Fox.224 Fox then promised to pay $300 dollars to
Lawrence. 225 After the promisor Fox breached, the third party Lawrence
recovered $300 breach-of-contract damages from the promisor Fox,
extinguishing Holly’s debt to Lawrence in the process. 226
In response to Fox’s nonperformance, Lawrence could have instead
sued Holly to recover the $300, extinguishing the original debt. Holly
could have then sued Fox for breach of contract and recovered the $300
of general expectation damages. In sum, like most promisees in third
party beneficiary contracts, Holly would not be adversely affected by
recognition of third party contract rights.

perform the promise even though he also has a similar duty to the third-party beneficiary.” (citing
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 305(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981))).
219. PERILLO, supra note 36, at 605 (“[A]ssignment extinguishes the right in the assignor and
transfers it to the assignee.”).
220. Id.
221. See, e.g., Campbell, 354 P.3d at 1180 (“Parkway’s argument completely ignores the wellestablished rule in contract law that even though a third-party beneficiary contract creates a duty to
the beneficiary, the promisee still has a right to performance.”); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONTRACTS § 305 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“[P]romisee of a promise for the benefit of a
beneficiary has the same right to performance as any other promisee.”).
222. 20 N.Y. 268 (1859).
223. Id. at 269.
224. Id.
225. Id.
226. Id.
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B.

Consequences of Third Party Contract Rights on the Promisor

1.

No Double Recovery

What could not have happened in Lawrence v. Fox was both the third
party Lawrence and the promisee Holly’s recovering $300 in general
expectation damages from Fox for breach of contract. The promisor is
protected from double liability for a single breach.
That protection can take various forms. If Lawrence, the third party
beneficiary, sues the promisor Fox first and recovers, then the promisee
Holly’s debt has been extinguished and Holly has no cause of action—
no expectation damages. Lawrence’s recovery from Fox would satisfy
Holly’s debt to Lawrence, leaving the promisee Holly in the same
position as if the contract had been performed. If, on the other hand, the
promisee Holly is the first to sue Fox, then Fox could protect itself from
the possibility of double liability by interpleader. 227
Double recovery from the promisor for the same loss is not a
consequence of third party contract rights. The third party and the
promisee cannot both recover from the promisor for the same loss. 228
2.

More Damages

In Lawrence v. Fox, the promisor Fox’s breach had the same effect on
both the third party Lawrence and the promisee Holly. Both Lawrence
and Holly would sustain the same $300 loss from the breach. The
general expectation damages that a court would award for Fox’s breach
would be the same amount, $300, regardless of whether the plaintiff was
Holly the promisee or Lawrence the third party.
In Lawrence v. Fox, as in other cases involving a “creditor
beneficiary,” permitting a third party to be a plaintiff did not change the
plaintiff’s loss, and therefore did not change the damages that the
plaintiff could recover from the breaching promisor.
As our second third party beneficiary case, Seaver v. Ransom,
illustrates, intended third party beneficiaries are not always creditor
beneficiaries. And, as Seaver v. Ransom and the other cases set out
below illustrate, a promisor’s breach will not always have the same
effect on both the third party and the promisee. Permitting a third party
227. PERILLO, supra note 36, at 600 (describing how to avoid double liability by “utilizing
interpleader procedure or other procedural techniques”).
228. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 305(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(“[S]atisfaction of the promisor’s duty to the beneficiary satisfies to that extent the promisor’s duty
to the promisee.”).
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to be a plaintiff can change the damages that can be recovered from the
breaching promisor.
Recall that the contract in Seaver v. Ransom 229 included a promise by
Judge Beman to his wife that he would leave $6000 to her niece, Marion
Seaver. 230 Mrs. Beman predeceased the Judge who then breached the
contract to leave $6000 to Marion Seaver in his will. 231 Because the
court held that Marion Seaver was an intended third party beneficiary,
she was entitled to recover expectation damages from the promisor,
Judge Beman’s estate. 232 And her expectation damages were $6000,
which put her in the same financial position as if there had been no
breach.233
The promisee would be Mrs. Beman or her estate. And, if Mrs.
Beman’s estate had sued Judge Beman’s estate for breach of contract,
any expectation damages awarded to Mrs. Beman’s estate (the promisee)
would have been $0 because the promisor Judge Beman’s breach had no
financial impact on the promisee Mrs. Beman’s estate. Under the
contract, Judge Beman promised to pay $6,000 to Marion Seaver; thus,
permitting Mrs. Beman’s estate to recover the $6,000 would have put the
estate in a better position that it would have been had Judge Beman
performed.
On the Seaver v. Ransom facts, permitting a third party to be the
plaintiff can change the damages that can be recovered from the
breaching promisor. And the possibility that the third party can recover
more from the promisor than the promisee is not limited to the facts of
Seaver v. Ransom.
Much more recently, the Supreme Court of South Carolina recognized
intended third party beneficiary rights in Fabian v. Lindsay. 234 In this
case, Dr. Denis Fabian (“Denis”) contracted with the law firm of
Lindsay & Lindsay (“Lindsay”) to prepare a trust under which Erika
Fabian (“Erika”) would receive half of his estate, subject to Denis’s
wife’s life estate. 235 The court recognized intended third party
beneficiary rights in Erika. 236 This imposed liability on the promisor
(Lindsay), that would not have been imposed in a lawsuit by the
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.

120 N.E. 639 (N.Y. 1918).
Id. at 639–40.
Id.
Id.
Id.
765 S.E.2d 132 (S.C. 2014).
Id.
Id. at 134.
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promisee (Denis). 237 All parties involved acknowledged that Denis had
intended to include Erika in his trust.238 After Denis’s death, Erika
discovered that, due to Lindsay’s drafting error, she had been effectively
disinherited.239
Erika sued Lindsay, alleging, inter alia, that Lindsay had breached its
contract with Denis and that she was an intended third party beneficiary
of that contract. 240 In ruling for Erika, the Court noted that, because
Denis was dead and his estate lacked both a cause of action and
damages, the only person entitled to damages for Lindsay’s breach of
contract was the third party beneficiary, Erika. 241
Since Denis’s estate was worth approximately $13 million, the
liability exposure of the promisor Lindsay to the third party Erika was
substantial. 242 Even if Denis’s estate could sue Lindsay for its breach of
contract, the estate’s recovery would be minimal or too uncertain to
award. Lindsay’s breach did not cause any financial loss to the estate. At
best, Denis’s estate could argue that Lindsay’s breach would have
distressed Denis if Denis were still alive. How can a court measure
expectation damages for distress of a deceased person? Answer: the
court cannot and so there is no recovery by the promisee. 243
Both Seaver and Fabian involved donee-beneficiaries who recovered
more than the promisee was entitled under the contract. However, this
outcome extends to other classes of third party beneficiaries, as well. For
example, in Cianciotto v. Hospice Care Network, 244 a New York District
Court permitted a third party beneficiary to recover consequential
damages despite the fact that such damages were not available to the
promisee.245 The litigation arose after Cianciotto’s father contracted with
Hospice Care Network (“HCN”) to provide him with palliative care for a
period of up to six months or until his death, depending on which
occurred first. 246 HCN allegedly breached the contract by refusing to

237. Id.
238. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 134.
241. Id. at 137.
242. Id. at 134.
243. Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 353 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(“Damages for emotional disturbance are not ordinarily allowed. Even if they are foreseeable, they
are often particularly difficult to establish and to measure.”).
244. 927 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Dist. Ct. Nassau Cty. 2011).
245. Id.
246. Id. at 781–82.
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provide care after “only a few weeks,” which forced Cianciotto to
resume caring for her father. 247 Upon her father’s death, Cianciotto filed
a suit claiming damages of $15,000 based on economic loss and
emotional distress stemming from missed employment opportunities and
being forced to watch her father deteriorate.248
The Court held that because the contract expressly contemplated a
benefit to Cianciotto by relieving her of some caregiving duties, her
claim should survive the motion to dismiss. 249 In so ruling, the court
noted that Cianciotto’s father and his estate did not suffer the damages
Cianciotto sought. 250
Obviously, in a lawsuit brought by the promisee, Cianciotto’s father,
or his estate, no expectation damages would be awarded for the third
party Cianciotto’s lost economic opportunities or pain and suffering.
Such damages are “special” to the third party beneficiary Cianciotto, i.e.,
the third party beneficiary’s consequential damages. 251
Third party beneficiaries can recover their consequential damages 252
unless the contract between the promisor and the promisee limits
remedies to exclude consequential damages. 253 And, the amount of those
consequential damages can be many times greater than the gross contract
price. 254
As a result, contracting parties should be, and are, concerned about
consequential damages. That is why so many commercial contracts
contain provisions eliminating liability for consequential damages.

247. Id. at 782.
248. Id. at 782, 785–86. Although emotional damages are not usually recoverable under breach of
contract claims, there is a special exception for contracts dealing with end of life care and the
handling of dead bodies, especially when the harm is a “direct” result of the breach as opposed to
being “consequential.”
249. Id. at 784.
250. Id. at 785–86.
251. See MURRAY, supra note 99, at 767 (“‘Special damages’ are often called ‘consequential
damages.’”).
252. See, e.g., Delgado v. Kornegay, 395 N.Y.S.2d 126, 127 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk Cty. 1977) (ruling
home purchaser was entitled to recover consequential damages resulting from breach of termite
inspection contract between home seller and inspector).
253. See, e.g., Harris Moran Seed Co. v. Phillips, 949 So. 2d 916, 930–31 (Ala. Civ. App. 2006)
(“As a third-party beneficiary of the contract between HMSC and Clifton Seed Company, the
farmers step into Clifton Seed Company’s shoes for purposes of the consequential-damages
exclusion.”).
254. Cf. Metro. Life Ins. v. Noble Lowndes Int’l, Inc., 643 N.E.2d 504, 508 (N.Y. 1994) (noting
that the seller “would be under inordinate economic pressure to complete performance, being at risk
of incurring liability for consequential damages in sums . . . many times greater than the gross
contract price” without a clause limiting liability).
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Indeed, concern about the impact of third party consequential
damages led to the Restatement excluding a third party’s recovery of
consequential damages under government contracts. 255 The test for
determining when a third party has contract rights under contracts
between private parties should at least reflect concern about the impact
of third party consequential damages on the promisor.
In sum, recognition of third party contract rights exposes the promisor
to the possibility of a different liability. The promisor’s breach might
have a different effect on the third party than on the promisee, leading to
different and possibly greater damages.
3.

More Litigation

Obviously, a determination that if a person breaches a contract then
not only the other contracting party but also a third party can be a
plaintiff, increases the possibility of litigation. Two tigers behind one of
the doors is more problematic than only one tiger behind one of the
doors. 256 While we cannot predict that enabling twice as many people to
be plaintiffs will result in twice as much litigation, it is reasonable to
argue—even without supporting empirical data—that determining that a
third party has contract rights means more litigation.
And, it is reasonable to argue that a third party might initiate litigation
in situations in which the other contracting party would not. Moreover,
this argument is supported by empirical data.
For example, as Professor Chapin Cimino recently wrote, “most legal
scholars accept the core insight of what is called relational contract
theory: most commercial contracts involve repeat players who seek to
maximize wealth while still maintaining cooperative relationships.” 257
These relationships are generally maintained by relying on non-legal
sanctions. These repeat players are reluctant to file a lawsuit because
litigating “threatens to disrupt the norms necessary to continuing
relations.” 258 Third parties have no such concern about disrupting
continuing relations because they have no cooperative relationship with
255. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 313(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) (“[A]
promisor who contracts with a government or governmental agency to do an act for or render a
service to the public is not subject to contractual liability to a member of the public for
consequential damages.”).
256. Cf. Frank R. Stockton, The Lady, or the Tiger?, CENTURY, Nov. 1882, at 83.
257. Chapin F. Cimino, The Relational Economics of Commercial Contract, 3 TEX. A&M L.
REV. 91, 91 (2015) (emphasis in original). See generally Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual
Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. SOC. REV. 55 (1963).
258. Jean Braucher, The Afterlife of Contract, 90 NW. U. L. REV. 49, 79 (1995).
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the promisor to continue. Therefore, third parties are more likely to sue
for breach of contract than a contracting party.
In sum, recognition of third party contract rights increases the
possibility that the promisor will be sued if it breaches and, at least in
some cases, increases the amount of damages that the plaintiff can
recover for such a breach. 259
C.

An Analytical Approach that Reflects Practical Consequences

The primary practical consequence of determining that a third party
can enforce a contract that an individual did not make is remedial: 260
more specifically, the creation of an additional possible plaintiff.
Remember, the third party is not merely a “beneficiary”; they are a
“plaintiff.”
The use of the term “beneficiary” to describe the third party only
makes sense in a historical context. Early cases such as Lawrence v.
Fox 261 and Seaver v. Ransom 262 relied on trust cases for precedent, 263
and the term “beneficiary” is of course an important part of trust law.
Under what Professor Lawrence Cunningham describes as common
law’s “iterative process,” subsequent cases continued to use the term
“beneficiary.” 264
In light of the practical consequences of determining that a third party
can enforce a contract, “additional possible plaintiff” is a more
descriptive contract law term than “third party beneficiary.” “Intent” that
someone can “benefit” from your performance of a contract is very
259. Cf. Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1429 (“[A]llowing a third party to enforce a contract may
unduly enlarge a promisor’s liability.”).
260. Id. at 1430 (labeling third party beneficiary law a “remedial device”); see also HENRY M.
HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW 136 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994) (“If A promises
B that he will pay B’s debt to C and the promise is valid and binding, it is obvious that C has a
primary ‘right’ at least in the sense of a claim to the benefit of the performance of A’s promise. But
as every first-year law student knows it has not been obvious to many courts that C has a right of
action against A if A fails to pay the debt. Only B, these courts have held, enjoys the remedial
capacity to hail A into court and enforce a sanction against him for breach of his promise. A system
of analysis which permits confusion between a primary claim to a performance and a remedial
capacity to invoke a sanction for nonperformance is dangerous at best.”).
261. Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N.Y. 268 (1859); see also supra section I.B.
262. Seaver v. Ransom, 120 N.E. 639 (N.Y. 1918); see also supra section I.C.
263. See Cunningham, supra note 33, at 751 (“The court’s [Lawrence v. Fox] input rule was from
the law of trusts and produced an output rule of contract law that permitted a stranger to a contract
to enforce it.”); Waters, supra note 7, at 1122, 1138.
264. Cunningham, supra note 33, at 750–57 (using Lawrence v. Fox and the third party
beneficiary cases following Lawrence v. Fox to illustrate common law as an “iterative process”).
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different from understanding that someone can sue you for not
performing a contract.
The use of the term “intended,” like the use of the term “beneficiary,”
creates unnecessary ambiguities because “intent” is more in the nature of
a conclusion than a test. “Intent” is a recurring concern in contract law,
and contract cases are divided as to what factors should lead to a
conclusion of intent.265
Ascertaining contractual intent is difficult enough in the typical
breach of contract action in which both the plaintiff and the defendant
were parties to the contract. Questions of intent become much more
complicated when a third party is the plaintiff because the jury will be
hearing the plaintiff’s arguments about contractual intention in a deal
that the plaintiff did not personally negotiate or document.
Consider the recently revised Florida jury instruction on third party
beneficiaries:
416.2 THIRD-PARTY BENEFICIARY
(Claimant) is not a party to the contract. However, (claimant)
may be entitled to damages for breach of the contract if
[he][she][it] proves that (insert names of the contracting parties)
intended that (claimant) benefit from their contract.266
An article in the Florida Bar Journal describes this as “a concise
instruction to give the jury to determine easily if someone is a third-party
beneficiary.” 267 With all due respect 268 to the author who is the “former
elected-Chair of the 1700-member Florida Appellate Practice
Section,” 269 we disagree. Perhaps we have read too many Carl Hiaasen

265. Compare Dietrich v. Stephens, No. 05-CV-72113, 2010 WL 1286204, at *4 (E.D. Mich.
Mar. 30, 2010) (“[I]ntent exists only at the time the contract was made.”), with Stender v. Twin City
Foods, Inc., 82 Wash. 2d 250, 510 P.2d 221, 224 (Wash. 1973) (“Determination of the intent of the
contracting parties is to be accomplished by viewing the contract as a whole, the subject matter and
objective of the contract, all the circumstances surrounding the making of the contract, the
subsequent acts and conduct of the parties to the contract, and the reasonableness of respective
interpretations advocated by the parties.” (emphasis added)). See also Uribe v. Merch. Bank of
N.Y., 693 N.E.2d 740, 743 (N.Y. 1998) (“‘[R]easonable expectation and purpose of the ordinary
business[person] when making an ordinary business contract’ serve as the guideposts to determine
intent.” (brackets in original)).
266. In re Standard Jury Instructions—Contract and Bus. Cases, 116 So. 3d 284, 304 (Fla. 2013).
267. Dorothy F. Easley, Florida’s New Jury Instructions in Contracts and Business Law Cases: A
Primer, 88 FLA. B.J. 40, 40 (Apr. 2014).
268. See With All Due Respect - Ricky Bobby.flv, YOUTUBE (Apr. 19, 2012), https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=xVTpCViyUwM (last visited Nov. 4, 2016).
269. Lawyers, EASLEY APPELLATE PRACTICE, http://www.easleyappellate.com/Appeal_Attorney.
html [https://perma.cc/3VGT-J8E8].
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novels, 270 but we believe that a Florida jury will neither “determine
easily if someone is a third party beneficiary” nor fully understand the
consequences of such a determination.
Professors Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott recently wrote about the
“uncertainty that attends the intent test.” 271 More specifically, they
question, “Does it mean acting with a motive to achieve a result or
knowing the result is likely to follow? Does it refer to the ‘ends’ the
actor seeks to achieve or the ‘means’ to those ends?” 272 Professors Scott
and Schwartz then suggest that “[a] law and economics analysis would
support an objective, functional test.” 273 While we do not warrant that
we understand all the law and economics formulae in the Schwartz and
Scott article, we also suggest an objective, functional test.
The function of third party beneficiary law is to identify when a
contracting party has the risk of additional possible plaintiffs. 274 Each
party to a contract is entitled to know the risks and liabilities involved in
entering a contract and that “necessarily includes the range of potential
third persons who may enforce the terms of the contract.” 275 Such
knowledge is essential to an informed decision on entering the contract
and pricing its terms. That is why the Florida instruction on special
damages is as follows:
504.2 BREACH OF CONTRACT DAMAGES
***...
b. Special damages:
. . . To recover special damages, (claimant) must prove that
when the parties made the contract, (defendant) knew or
reasonably should have known of the special circumstances
leading to such damages. 276

270. Cf. Erin Z. Bass, Carl Hiaasen’s Most Memorable Characters, DEEP S. MAGAZINE (June 11,
2013), http://deepsouthmag.com/2013/06/carl-hiaasens-most-memorable-characters/ [https://perma
.cc/XQ4A-JALB].
271. Schwartz & Scott, supra note 9.
272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See FARNSWORTH, supra note 115, at 6 (describing third party beneficiary law as “one
aspect of the extent of risk undertaken by a contracting party”); Eisenberg, supra note 8, at 1430
(labeling third party beneficiary law a “remedial device”).
275. Gazo v. City of Stamford, 765 A.2d 505, 514 (Conn. 2001). See Powers, supra note 9, at 78
(suggesting “overriding policy” in third party beneficiary law should be “how is a contracting party
to evaluate the risks and liabilities involved in entering a contract.”).
276. In re Standard Jury Instructions—Contract and Bus. Cases, 116 So. 3d 284, 333 (Fla. 2013)
(emphasis in original).
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And that knowledge of possible obligations necessarily should
include the range of third persons who can enforce the contract—the
additional possible plaintiffs. Accordingly, the jury instruction in Florida
and other states for whether a third party can be a plaintiff in an action to
enforce a contract that she did not make should ask: “did the defendant
have reason to know at the time of the contract that the third party was
an additional possible plaintiff who could ultimately recover damages?”
Under the law governing contract damages, Ed’s liability exposure to
Bud for breach of the butcher shop sale contract would be limited to the
losses he had “reason to foresee as a probable result of the breach when
the contract was made.” 277 Under the law governing third parties’
contract rights, Ed’s possible liability exposure to Noreen or other third
parties should be similarly limited. Simply put, the question should be
whether Ed would have made the contract with Bud on the same terms if
he had reason to know at the time of the contract that Noreen was an
additional possible plaintiff in the event of his later breach. 278
CONCLUSION
As Albert Camus (and perhaps Noreen 279) would tell us, “One
recognizes one’s course by discovering the paths that stray from it.” 280
The present law of third party beneficiaries “strays.” It reflects its
nineteenth century analytical origins, not its twenty-first century
application. In determining whether a third party has the legal right to
enforce a contract she did not make, courts ask whether the contracting

277. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 351(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981). The language
of the Restatement is not identical to the language of the Uniform Commercial Code or the Florida
jury instruction. The Restatement uses the phrase “reason to foresee,” id., while Uniform
Commercial Code section 2-715 and the Florida jury instruction use “reason to know” and
“reasonably should have known.” U.C.C. § 2-715(2)(a) (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM’N
2002). A comprehensive review of the consequential damages case law suggests “courts freely
interchange these expressions.” Thomas A. Diamond & Howard Foss, Consequential Damages for
Commercial Loss: An Alternative to Hadley v. Baxendale, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 665, 669 (1994).
278. Cf. Immanuel Kant, An Answer to the Question: What Is Enlightenment?, in PRACTICAL
PHILOSOPHY 20 (Mary J. Gregor ed. and trans., 1996) (“The touchstone of everything that can be
concluded as a law for a people lies in the question whether the people could have imposed such a
law on itself.”).
279. Cf. Terri Schwartz, Fargo: The Gift of the Magi, IGN (Nov. 10, 2015),
http://in.ign.com/m/the-gift-of-the-magi/82994/review/fargo-the-gift-of-the-magi-review
[https://perma.cc/5R25-PFYB] (“Noreen, the butcher shop cashier, was reading ‘The Myth of
Sisyphus’ in scenes.”).
280. See ALBERT CAMUS, Absurd Creation: Ephemeral Creation, in THE MYTH OF SISYPHUS
AND OTHER ESSAYS 93, 113 (Justin O’Brien trans., 1955).
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parties intended to confer a benefit on the plaintiff. In short, the test is
“intent to benefit.” 281
We have argued here that this is the wrong test and the wrong
question. And, of course, asking juries the wrong question is more likely
to lead to the wrong result than asking the right question.
The “course” should be appropriate liability exposure for contracting
parties. The result of recognizing third party contract rights is enlarging
a contracting party’s liability exposure.
Enlarging a contract party’s liability exposure and finding a contract
party’s intention to benefit someone are not the same thing. The function
of the test for whether a third party has contract rights should be to
assure that a person can enter into a contract with the confidence that she
will not later find herself bound to unanticipated obligations.
Accordingly, courts should take a different, more functional “path” to
third party contract rights. Instead of determining whether buyer Ed
Blomquist and/or seller Bud Jorgenlen intended for the contract for the
sale of Bud’s Butcher Shop to benefit Noreen Vanderslice as courts now
do, a court should determine whether Ed had reason to know, at the time
he contracted with Bud, that Noreen or some other third person similar
to Noreen was an additional possible plaintiff in the event he breached,
i.e. an “APP.”

281. See, e.g., Hickman v. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am., 695 N.W.2d 365, 367 (Minn. 2005) (“The
issue in this case is whether appellant . . . is a third-party beneficiary . . . under the ‘intent to benefit’
test.”).

